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Abstract
This article addresses the extent to which the public role or profile of an indi-
vidual can affect their reasonable expectation of privacy under Article 8 European 
Convention of Human Rights. It argues that the case law shows that status as a 
‘public figure’ does have some limited impact on the expectation of privacy. It 
goes on to assess whether politicians are treated as a separate category of ‘public 
figure’. The conclusion is that some differential treatment is revealed and that the 
general impact of public profile on privacy is broadened for politicians. The ra-
tionales for this differential treatment though also apply to other figures who wield 
power and influence on matters of public concern.
1. Introduction
Those Scots considering a future in politics are warned by their Careers Serv-
ice that; ‘As a public figure you will have less privacy than before. People have 
expectations about the way that a politician should behave. You have to think 
carefully about your personal lifestyle, and be prepared for strong interest from the 
media’ (Careers Service Scotland, 2007).
This article explores whether politicians are singled out as a particular type 
of public figure under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in ways that affect their reasonable expectation of privacy. To address 
this issue it aims to identify the general scope of the right to privacy under Article 
8 ECHR and the values protected by it. It assesses the general impact that the 
status of an applicant as a ‘public figure’ can have on their expectation of privacy, 
deriving both from their voluntary actions and inherently from their status. From 
this basis the article aims to explore whether politicians are treated as a different 
category of ‘public figure’, the scope of the categorization and the extent to which 
it leads to differential treatment of privacy claims. Its final objective is to evaluate 
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the rationales for this differentiation and assess whether they apply exclusively 
to politicians or have some application to other individuals who wield power and 
influence over the lives of citizens. Its focus is on the position under ECHR law, 
but it also considers, particularly English, domestic law that seeks to implement 
the ECHR obligations.
2. Public figures
The level of protection that public figures and especially politicians are enti-
tled to has been extensively considered in defamation cases by the European Court 
of Human Rights (‘the Court’), for example Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 
407, and the English courts, for example Reynolds v Times Newspapers [1999] 
4 All ER 609. The issue has also been subject to detailed consideration in the US 
(e.g. New York Times Co. v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254). The concepts of quali-
fied privilege and public figure defence developed in these cases though relate to 
reputation rather than privacy (Phillipson and Fenwick, 2000: p.685). There has 
been a narrower range of cases that directly concern the balance between privacy 
and expression rights for politicians as public figures. These have generally found 
that such figures do have the right of protection for their private life but with some 
qualifications.
In these cases the applicant’s privacy rights under Article 8 ECHR are en-
gaged and the defendant’s rights to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR 
are engaged. Article 8 ECHR provides that ‘Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’. It obviously has a 
broad scope and applies to issues including family life, sexual autonomy and en-
vironmental threats to the home (Ovey and White, 2006, pp.241-298). At its core 
though is the right to privacy, providing protections on the gathering and use of 
personal information. The question of what constitutes personal information can 
be a difficult one. The personal quality can arise from the nature of the informa-
tion (sex life, medical details, personal financial information) or from the circum-
stances in which it is imparted (within a confidential business relationship, within 
an intimate friendship, within the applicant’s home). The leading case before the 
Court, von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1, gives personal information 
a very broad reading. There was little conceptual analysis leading to the conclu-
sions in that case (Fenwick and Phillipson, 2006: p.667), but the outcome was that 
photographs of someone in the street carrying out activities of daily living, such as 
shopping, were capable of engaging Article 8. Despite indications that this finding 
arose from the longstanding and almost continual low-level media harassment of 
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the applicant, the Court subsequently confirmed that its approach was not limited 
to circumstances of harassment (Sciacca v Italy [2006] 43 EHRR 20).
A full explanation of all the criteria that can affect the finding on whether 
there has been an interference with personal information, such as what is a ‘public 
place’ and the impact of location, is beyond the scope of this article, but the key 
test that has emerged is the reasonable expectation of privacy test outlined in the 
section below. An important guide in deciding when this reasonable expectation 
may arise comes from the key values protected by Article 8 ECHR of informa-
tional autonomy and human dignity. Informational autonomy is the right of an in-
dividual to control the flow of personal information about themselves (Phillipson 
and Fenwick, 2000: p.662; see also Chadwick, 2006). ‘What human rights law has 
done is to identify private information as something worth protecting as an aspect 
of human autonomy and dignity’, (per Lord Hoffman, Campbell: para 50).
Article 8(2) ECHR though establishes that the privacy right is not absolute; 
‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of… the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. 
These rights and freedoms will include the freedom of expression of the defend-
ant. Article 10 ECHR provides that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expres-
sion. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference …’. Article 10 ECHR is similarly non-
absolute and allows restrictions, on the same basis as Article 8 ECHR, ‘for the 
protection of the reputation and rights of others’. In circumstances like this, there 
is no presumptive priority for any one Article and the particular exercise of the 
competing rights in the specific circumstances of the case have to be carefully 
weighed (Ovey and White, 2006: p.6). The familiar proportionality test of ECHR 
law normally involves a close scrutiny of the broader societal interest, such as 
public health, invoked to restrict the Convention right. The national law must be 
clear and necessary and only go as far as is required to secure the societal interest. 
In circumstances where there are two competing Convention rights, the question 
is one of a fair balance between them (Ovey and White, 2006: p.6). This requires 
identification and correct assessment of all relevant factors, including, where ap-
plicable, the status of the applicant as a public figure and in the case of a politician 
as a particular archetype of ‘public figure’. This paper first examines the general 
significance of the categorization ‘public figure’ and then the particular position of 
politicians as a subset of the broader group.
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A. Public Figures and the Right to Privacy
Public figures have a right to privacy. Any notion that a human right does not 
generally apply to a group of human beings would be a striking proposition. In ad-
dition, there is nothing in the core values protected by Article 8 (the development 
of the personality and informational autonomy), to suggest that they do apply to 
public figures.
The leading cases in both the European Court of Human Rights, (von Han-
nover), and English law, (Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457), stressed the 
fundamental importance of privacy for the development of personality of every 
human. According to von Hannover (para. 69) ‘anyone, even if they are known to 
the general public, must be able to enjoy a “legitimate expectation” of protection 
of and respect for their private life’ (see also Craxi v Italy (No.2) [2003] ECHR 
24337/94, para. 65, ‘Public figures are entitled to the enjoyment of the guarantees 
set out in Article 8 of the Convention on the same basis as every other person’). In 
Campbell (per Lord Nicholls, para. 12) it was said that ‘A proper degree of privacy 
is essential for the well being and development of an individual’, and that ‘even a 
public figure would ordinarily be entitled to privacy’ (per Lord Hoffman, para. 36; 
see also A v B plc [2003] QB 195 (per Lord Woolf, para. 11(xi)), that ‘A public 
figure is entitled to a private life’).
The key test that has emerged from these cases is, does the applicant have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy? The test was adopted by the House of Lords in 
Campbell (per Lord Nicholls, para. 21) and has been applied by lower courts since 
(for example in McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194). Although it featured more 
in the concurring opinions than in the main judgement in von Hannover, it has 
been explicitly adopted in subsequent cases such as Karhuvaara v Finland (2005) 
41 EHRR 51. The reasonable expectation test provides for a flexible approach and 
there is a range of dicta to suggest that the public profile of an applicant can have 
an effect on the level of privacy that they can expect.
The concurring opinions in von Hannover emphasized the pressures on the 
privacy of high profile people. Judge Cabral Barreto said (Concurring Opinion, 
para. 2), ‘In view of their fame, a public figure’s life outside the home and par-
ticularly in public places, is inevitably subject to certain constraints. Fame and 
public interest inevitably give rise to a difference in treatment of the private life of 
an ordinary person and that of a public figure’. Similarly, Judge Zupančič argued 
that (Concurring Opinion, para. 1), ‘He who willingly steps onto the public stage 
cannot claim to be a private person entitled to anonymity. Royalty, actors, academ-
ics, politicians etc. perform whatever they perform publicly. They may not seek 
publicity, yet, by definition, their image is to some extent public property’. Both 
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judges found that the limits of private life are difficult to define, and can only be 
dealt with using the reasonable expectation test and approaching the question on 
a case-by-case basis.
The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution on ‘The right to 
privacy’ has been regularly cited by the Court and by domestic courts. It points 
out that the private information of public figures is lucrative and is often invaded 
but that they ‘must recognise that the special position they occupy in society – in 
many cases by choice – automatically entails increased pressure on their privacy’ 
(Council of Europe, 1998: para. 6).
This special interest is also recognised in domestic law. In Tammer v Estonia 
(2003) 37 EHRR 43 (para. 29) it was found by the domestic courts that Estonian 
law allowed public figures to be subject to special interest of the press, who had 
the right to describe the life of a public figure more thoroughly than an ordinary 
citizen. The English courts have similarly recognized that the relationship of pub-
lic figure with the media ‘is different from that of people who expose less of their 
private life to the public’ (Campbell, per Lord Hoffman, para. 37).
Clearly then, the public profile of the applicant will have a practical effect on 
their level of privacy and, to some extent, a legal effect on their reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, but what aspects of this expectation are affected and what is the 
rationale for this?
B. The Balance between Privacy and Speech Claims
The reasonable expectation test is specifically concerned with whether the 
information ought to be regarded as private and as to the weight of the privacy 
claim. The actions or inherent status of public figures though can also affect the 
strength of the opposing expression claim. 
1. Voluntary Actions
Voluntarily revealing aspects of one’s private life and the related issue of ar-
guments from hypocrisy can affect the relative strength of the competing claims. 
They are not inherently limited to public figures but are very likely to arise only in 
relation to an individual who has an existing public profile.
It seems intuitive that if a public figure has voluntarily revealed aspects of 
their private life to the public they will have a lower expectation of privacy in rela-
tion to that private life than someone who has not made such revelations. The issue 
has not been considered by the Court though, and the domestic courts in England 
have been reluctant to allow this argument to be used in a broad-brush manner.
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Voluntary revelation arguments are derived largely from Woodward v Hutch-
ins [1977] 1 WLR 760, that those who seek favourable publicity in relation to their 
private lives cannot complain about the revelation of unfavourable publicity. This 
notion of implied consent was pleaded in McKennitt through the ‘zone argument’, 
i.e. that putting some parts of one’s private life into the public domain allows oth-
ers to disclose other information from within that same zone of information. It was 
argued that the claimant’s limited public comments (to support accident preven-
tion charities) on the accidental death of her fiancé put that zone of her life into 
the public domain. This was rejected as ‘cruelly insensitive’ and it did not justify 
opening ‘whole areas of her private life to intense scrutiny’ (McKennitt: para.54). 
Woodward was further distinguished on the basis that McKennitt had not sought 
favourable publicity of her private life (McKennitt: para.36).
The implied consent argument has had a similarly cool reception in other 
recent cases. In Douglas v Hello! (No.2) [2003] EWCA Civ 139 the only rel-
evant information was the specific information in the dispute, i.e. the wedding 
photographs, not the previous voluntary revelations of Douglas and Zeta-Jones. 
In Campbell the only relevant disclosures were in relation to her drug use not 
other areas of private life where she had previously courted favourable publicity. 
The concept was applied in Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 but only 
because the claimant’s conduct in the case concerned the issue, sexual conduct, on 
which there had been previous disclosures.
Additionally, implied consent on the basis of voluntary revelations is not con-
sistent with the personal autonomy rationale for Article 8 (Phillipson and Fen-
wick, 2000: p.679-80). Under informational autonomy individuals have an inter-
est in being able to control the flow of personal information. It is their decision to 
disclose or withhold details of their private lives. On this basis, Phillipson (2003: 
p.742) rejects even a limited notion of implied consent; any previous disclosures 
amount to an exercise of the right of privacy not an abandonment. He admits 
though that despite its logical force this position may cause unease. In relation to 
figures who actively try to control their perception by the public, McInnes (2004: 
p.7) argues that ‘there may be a buried assumption that image management … is 
in fact an assault on the that truth, whole truth and nothing but the truth on which 
the courts routinely insist’, that suppression of the truth can very easily cross the 
line into false suggestion, and the courts should be very wary of promoting this 
outcome.
Phillipson (2003, p.742) proposes that any concession to these doubts about 
selective presentation should be narrowly drawn, applying only where a) previous 
information amounts to manipulation intended to mislead the public on a matter 
of some importance, or b) details of private life are voluntarily, repeatedly and 
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thoroughly placed into the public domain (particularly for profit) so that the private life 
can be regarded as commodified. It is unclear in the absence a law report, but this may 
well have been the basis for allowing publication of private information in Beckham v 
Gibson (Unreported, 29 April, 2005, QBD, Langley J.).
There is a close relationship here with arguments from hypocrisy, that is, that the 
behaviour of the claimant is so inconsistent with their public persona that there is a 
public interest, buttressing the expression claim, in exposing the hypocrisy and setting 
the record straight.
In von Hannover, it was argued that it was legitimate to show public figures out-
side of their function partly because of the legitimate interest in judging whether their 
personal behaviour tallies with their behaviour on official engagements. The interven-
ing publishers claimed that restricting the right to take photographs to official func-
tions favours ‘selective presentation that would deprive the public of certain necessary 
judgmental possibilities in respect of figures from socio-political life’ (von Hannover: 
para. 25). This argument was not directly addressed as there was no specific allegation 
of hypocrisy in relation to Princess Caroline’s conduct. Some kind of watching brief, 
leading to publication, of the activities of public figures in case they act hypocritically 
is clearly unacceptable.
In Campbell it was found that the claimant was correct in not seeking to block pub-
lication of the fact of her drug use and treatment for addiction. She had lied about the is-
sue previously and the newspaper was justified in exposing that hypocrisy. There have, 
though, been some judicial statements indicating a narrow reading of this justification. 
At first instance in McKennitt, Eady J was concerned that it would stop public figures 
sharing their ideals or aspirations with their audience and that ‘a very high degree of 
misbehaviour must be demonstrated’. This was rejected on appeal, though the Court of 
Appeal interpreted Campbell as indicating that it was important that she had not merely 
lied about taking drugs, but that she had ‘gone out of her way’ to emphasize that this 
distinguished her from other fashion models (McKennitt: paras 67-70). This is an un-
necessary gloss and the position is best summarized by Lord Hope that ‘where a public 
figure chooses to make untrue pronouncements about his or her private life, the press 
will normally be entitled to put the record straight’ (Campbell: para. 82). The interest 
in correcting previous false statements, almost always from public figures, continues to 
provide a powerful support to some expression claims.
2. Inherent Status
If a public figure becomes a role model through their pronouncements on a 
public issue or their principled stance on a social question, then any disjunction 
between their ‘role model persona’ and the reality of their private life on that issue, 
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can be dealt with through the principles outlined above. It has been argued though 
that public figures become role models as an inherent consequence of their public 
profile. Lord Woolf in A v B plc (para. 11(xii)) found that even though he had not 
sought that distinction, the claimant was a role model on the basis of his sporting 
success. This meant that he should expect closer scrutiny by the media and be 
expected to conduct himself according to high standards. A similar argument, that 
‘since celebrities embody certain moral values and lifestyles’ they can provide ex-
amples that people chose to adopt or reject, was accepted by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (von Hannover: para. 25).
Ultimately though, this ‘involuntary role model’ concept has been much criti-
cized and judicially rejected. It rests on unsupported suppositions of how the be-
haviour of public figures influences the general public and is utterly inconsistent 
with the concept of informational autonomy (Phillipson, 2003: p.741; Aplin, 2007, 
p.46). In the Court of Appeal in Campbell (para. 151) it was said that if someone 
was a role model ‘without seeking that distinction’ then it was not necessarily in 
the public interest to show that they had ‘feet of clay’ (see also McKennitt: para. 
65). Both Rudolf (2006) and Sanderson (2004) argue that the role model argument 
was implicitly rejected by the Court in von Hannover. 
Is there any scope for arguing that the inherent status of being a public figure 
affects the expectation of privacy? In von Hannover, Princess Caroline was cat-
egorized under German law as a figure of contemporary society par excellence 
(“eine absolute person der Zeitgeschichte”). The protection of her image rights 
was therefore less than for an ordinary person. Outside of her home, she could 
only rely on protection of her privacy if she had retired to a ‘secluded place’ where 
it was objectively clear that she wanted to be left alone (von Hannover: paras. 
23-24). The domestic courts had held that the public had a legitimate interest in 
knowing and seeing how she behaved in public because she was a public figure. 
This was unambiguously rejected by the Court, but largely on the basis that she 
should not have been categorized as public figure under German law and that the 
expression claim was exceedingly weak. It is arguable that, even after von Hanno-
ver, there remain some circumstances where a finding that the applicant is a public 
figure inherently affects their expectation of privacy.
The first relates to innocuous facts. In McKennitt (para. 139), it was held that 
not all the information that had passed between the parties in the course of a rela-
tionship of confidence was worthy of protection by the court, for example, infor-
mation on a shopping trip to Italy was found to be trivial, and crucially, non-intru-
sive. In Murray v Express Newspapers [2007] All ER (D) 39 (Aug), (para. 66), the 
English High Court found that there remained even after von Hannover ‘an area 
of routine activity which when conducted in a public place carries no guarantee of 
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privacy’. The notion that a simple walk down the street could be characterized as 
private was particularly troublesome in relation to celebrities, as it meant that they 
could confine photographs of themselves to concerts, film premieres and the like. 
Similarly, what may be intrusive to a private individual may be public knowledge 
for a public figure. In Karhuvaara (para. 44) it was pointed out that the newspaper 
only reported the fact of the MP’s marriage which was already public knowledge. 
In other words, the borderline between private information and innocuous facts 
can be affected by public figure status.
This ability for public profile to turn what would otherwise be an objec-
tionable use of private information into an acceptable exercise of freedom 
of the press is seen most clearly in cases concerning image rights. Control 
over use of one’s image is often linked to privacy and is clearly capable of 
protection under Article 8. A number of cases before the Court have shown 
that if there is a story in the public interest then use of an individual’s image 
to accompany the story will be permissible, particularly if it is context-less 
and does not reveal further details of private life. In Krone Verlag v Austria 
(2003) 36 EHRR 57, for example, there was an allegation of unjust enrich-
ment involving an individual who was a member of the national and Euro-
pean parliaments. The newspaper story had an accompanying photograph and 
the MP tried to injunct the use of the photograph only. The domestic court 
held that his interest in privacy and the use of his own image outweighed the 
newspaper interest because it had no informational value and his face was 
not generally known. The Court held that there was little scope for restric-
tions on political speech or questions of public interest and found in favour 
of the newspaper’s expression claim. It was not so much his public profile 
as his status as a public figure deriving from his role that affected use of his 
image.
The scope for the inherent characteristics of being a public figure to im-
pact on the expectation of privacy remain unclear. The courts have been will-
ing to proceed on a case-by-case basis and have avoided general propositions 
of law on the connection between public profile and privacy. It has not been 
explicitly stated but this is consistent with the adoption of the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test. Such a test necessarily involves looking at the full 
range of factors in each case. It has been pointed out though that the absence 
of any findings of broad principle would leave the interpretive discretion 
unstructured and result in excessive uncertainty (see CC v AB [2006] All ER 
(D) 39 (Dec)). It is argued below that some tentative and broad statements 
of principle can be made as to how politicians ought to be regarded as public 
figures and as to how this may affect their expectation of privacy.
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3. Politicians
A. A Separate Category?
The profession of politician is the one that comes most readily to mind for 
writers and judges who want to illustrate that there may be a reduced expecta-
tion of privacy or a public interest in disclosing information about private life. In 
Campbell, (para. 60) Lord Hoffman outlines what he regards as the relatively ano-
dyne additional details about the claimant’s medical treatment and distinguishes 
this from cases where there is public interest in disclosure, e.g. of a sexual re-
lationship ‘say between, a politician and someone she has appointed to public 
office’. Phillipson and Fenwick (2000: p.685), for example, argue that a genuine 
conflict between Articles 8 and 10 ECHR only arises in a narrow range of cases, 
such as ‘where publication relates to the personal life of a particular figure, but 
there is a serious argument that it serves a valuable purpose in revealing a matter 
relevant to that person’s fitness for office’. The cases, though, do not disclose a 
clear approach of treating politicians as a completely distinct category. They do, 
however, indicate that politicians are such an archetype of ‘public figure’ that they 
can be subject to some differences of approach. Sanderson (2004: p.637) argues 
that politicians must be taken as a sort of ‘special paradigmatic case’.
There is some authority pointing to a conception of ‘politician’ as category 
sui generis. In von Hannover, the criterion of performing some State function was 
important in the approach of the Court to assessing Princess Caroline’s status. It 
pointed out that whilst she was president of various humanitarian and cultural 
foundations and represented the Royal Family of Monaco at some charitable and 
social functions, she did not ‘perform any function within or on behalf of the State 
of Monaco or any of its institutions’ (para. 8). Once the Court had defined ‘public 
figure’ solely by reference to public function (i.e. exercise of official State powers) 
the Princess was put in the same category as a wholly private person, one ‘entirely 
unknown to the public’ (Sanderson, 2004: p.637). This lead the Court to conclude 
that the public had no legitimate interest in knowing where Princess Caroline is 
and how she behaves generally in her private life. The High Court in Murray 
(para. 42), considering von Hannover, said that someone like Princess Caroline 
was a ‘well-known but not a public figure in the sense of being a politician or the 
like’. So the leading case on the issue does seem to indicate that there is a category 
of public figures (entirely comprised of public office holders) and everyone else is 
in the category of ‘private individual’.
It is important though to take into account the legal context of the litigation. 
German law provided protection on the use of images of individuals (Copyright 
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(Arts Domain) Act, cited in von Hannover: paras 40-1). There was an exception 
that photographs depicting scenes of contemporary society could be published 
without obtaining the consent of all those included in the photographs. This excep-
tion included depictions of figures of contemporary society par excellence. The 
facts of the case concerned, therefore, not the impact of categorization as a public 
figure on a general right to privacy, but on the narrower question of protection of 
image rights. It was in this context that the Court found that Princess Caroline 
ought not to have come within the categorization. It did though go further than this 
finding to doubt the general validity of a concept of figure of contemporary society 
par excellence. It concluded that the category ‘could conceivably be appropriate 
for politicians exercising official functions’ (von Hannover: para. 72). Since the 
category is largely about the use of image rights it cannot realistically be limited 
to politicians in this way. It would otherwise exclude taking pictures of e.g. a film 
star attending a premiere (or Princess Caroline attending a charity ball). It does 
though reveal a mindset in the judgment that any concession to status as a public 
figure should be strictly limited, and that the obvious exemplars for a limited con-
ception of public figure are politicians.
The weight of authority though more explicitly places politicians as a par-
ticular subset within a broader category of public figures. The Council of Europe 
Resolution (1998: para. 7), seems to set up this two tier approach stating that 
the category of public figures comprises those ‘holding public office and/or us-
ing resources [and] more broadly speaking, all those who play a role in public 
life, whether in politics, the economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport or in any 
other domain’. A similar approach is taken in the domestic law of some States. 
Provisions of Finnish domestic law, for example, were outlined in Karhuvarra; 
‘The spreading of information, an insinuation or an image of the private life of a 
person in politics, business, public office or a public position, or in a comparable 
position, shall not constitute an invasion of personal reputation, …’ (S.8, Chp 24 
(531/2000) Penal Code of Finland). The German Federal Constitutional Court 
in von Hannover (para. 24) found that ‘This public interest [in politicians] has 
always been deemed to be legitimate from the point of view of transparency and 
democratic control’, but also that in principle this interest exists in respect of other 
public figures. It is therefore legitimate to show people in situations that are not 
limited to their function, subject to balancing with other rights. This view was 
echoed by the intervening publishers that ‘the public’s legitimate interest in being 
informed was not limited to politicians, but extended to public figures who had 
become known for other reasons’ (von Hannover: para. 46).
Judge Cabral Barreto, in his concurring opinion in von Hannover, refers to 
the Council of Europe Resolution in arguing that a public figure does not neces-
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sarily perform State functions. He cites paragraph 9; ‘Certain facts relating to the 
private lives of public figures, particularly politicians, may indeed be of interest to 
citizens’ and finds that ‘If that is true of politicians it is also true of all other public 
figures in whom the public takes an interest’ (Concurring Opinion, para. 2; see 
also A v B plc, para 11(xii)). On this basis he concludes that ‘information about 
[Princess Caroline’s] life contributes to a debate of general interest. The general 
interest does not have to be limited to political debate’ (Concurring Opinion, para. 
2). We should remind ourselves here that identification of these characteristics 
as relevant factors does not determine the outcome of the case; they need to be 
weighed together with any other strengths and weaknesses in the privacy claim 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the expression claim.
There is obviously a potential for significant overlap between image rights 
and privacy issues, as outlined in relation to von Hannover and Krone Verlag 
above. In Krone Verlag use of the image of a politician was at stake. The national 
court ruling that the applicant was not sufficiently well-known to justify use of his 
image to illustrate a story with a clear public interest was rejected by the Court. 
It held that the issue of how well-known or not a person is has little importance; 
‘What counts is whether this person has entered the public arena. This is the case 
of a politician on account of his public functions, a person participating in a pub-
lic debate, an association which is active in a field of public concern, on which it 
enters into public discussions, or a person who is suspected of having committed 
offences of a political nature which attract the attention of the public’ (Krone Ver-
lag: para. 37). This is not a list arrived at through deduction from first principles, 
but a compilation of the circumstances of actual cases heard by the Court. This 
emphasizes the pragmatic case-by-case approach of the Court, and the term ‘enter 
the public arena’ is interesting as it obviously places politicians at its centre, but is 
by no means limited to them.
There is a similar overlap in relation to laws restricting personal criticism, for 
example, Krone Verlag (para. 35), ‘The limits of acceptable criticism are wider 
with regard to a politician acting in his public capacity than in relation to a private 
individual, as the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close 
scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large’. 
In Karhuvaara (para. 11) the defendant newspaper claimed that the applicant MP, 
as ‘a public political figure, must tolerate more from the media than an “average 
citizen”’. This was partly accepted by the Finnish court, with the proviso that it 
only applied to matters connected to her public functions and in so far as there was 
a public interest justifying disclosure. The Court agreed that as a politician she had 
to endure more from the press than the average citizen. It overturned the national 
court ruling though because, even though the story had no direct bearing on politi-
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cal issues or direct links with her role as a politician it came within the remit of her 
having to endure more than the average citizen (Karhuvaara: para. 44). This can 
be interpreted as one of the ‘special circumstances’ mentioned in von Hannover 
where politicians may have a lowered expectation of privacy.
B. Who is a Politician?
Given that there do seem to be some legal consequences flowing from placing 
an individual within the category of ‘politician’, there has been very little consid-
eration of who is ‘a politician’. The term clearly applies to those in party politics 
who hold elective office. Across Europe though, there is a very wide variety of 
governmental, political and administrative structures and even within each State 
there will often be no clear division between public office and quasi-governmental 
positions. In Radio Twist v Slovakia (2006) 22 BHRC 396, (para. 14) for example 
it was noted as relevant, that even though the posts that the complainants held 
had administrative titles they were actually political and not civil service appoint-
ments. In these circumstances it must be questioned whether a general approach 
is possible.
Categorization could be limited to those in elective office on the basis of the 
rationales for differential treatment outlined below at section 3.C. The formal 
mechanisms of political accountability apply most directly to elected party politi-
cians (though those in quasi-governmental positions are also made accountable in 
a number of ways) and the ‘readers as voters’ concept, also attaches most strongly 
to elected office (though public opinion can affect the tenability of holding even 
non-elected office). A narrow focus on elected office, though, would miss a wide 
range of people who exercise state power, or more broadly who exercise power 
and influence on matters of public concern.
The US approach, according to Prosser, 1960 (in Phillipson and Fenwick, 
2000: p.688) ‘strives for a rough proportionality between the importance of the 
office the person holds and the range of ordinarily protected information that may 
be revealed’. This has the advantage of flexibility and of focusing on power and 
influence. Rudolf (2004: p.537) argues that the decisive criterion is not a person’s 
status as politician or non-politician but ‘whether a person’s public activities cre-
ate a legitimate public interest in the information in question’. The status of the 
individual is important to the extent that the greater the power wielded over the 
public, the greater the public need to know about that individual. Phillipson and 
Fenwick (2000: p.688) propose that this includes not just elected posts but those 
employed by the state ‘to make decisions directly affecting the basic interests of 
the citizenry’, for example of governor of the national bank or chief of police. We 
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should also recognise that some individuals though formally only private citizens 
may have ‘great practical power over the lives of people or great influence in the 
formation of public opinion … which may exceed that of most politicians’ (per 
Lord Cooke, Reynolds, at 640). The obvious example would be a global media 
magnate such as Rupert Murdoch, but the argument could also apply, in a form 
that recognised any disparity of power, to the leader of a large trade union, or the 
CEO of a supermarket with a large share of the consumer market.
There has been no attempt in ECHR or domestic English case law to define 
the category of ‘politician’ for privacy purposes. The rationales for differential 
treatment do point to a focus on elective office. This though could expose those 
wielding very limited powers, such as local authority councillors to a lower expec-
tation of privacy whilst missing those who exercise significant power and influ-
ence (whether from State or private sources of power) over the lives of citizens.
C. Differential Treatment?
Sanderson (2004, p.637) argues that as only politicians fulfil both the compet-
ing claims of the meaning ‘public’, in that a) they exercise public function, and 
b) they are well-known to the general public, there is ‘a very nearly universal 
agreement that the media is generally entitled to examine the private as well as the 
public lives of politicians’. The cases, though, do not disclose this general entitle-
ment. The impact of categorization as a politician on an individual’s expectation 
of privacy is more subtle than this, nevertheless, some differential treatment can 
be identified.
The approach of the Court in von Hannover (para. 63) was that a ‘fundamen-
tal distinction needs to be made between reporting facts – even controversial ones 
– capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating to politicians 
in the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting details of the private 
life of an individual who, moreover, as in this case, does not exercise official func-
tions’. This is clearly true but there is huge gap between the two examples, and 
whilst this formulation distinguishes two very different sets of circumstances, it 
does not provide a demarcation line between information which is clearly publish-
able (on a politician’s exercise of their public functions) and information which 
is not. Rather it differentiates two positions on different ends of a continuum, 
without giving guidance on the wide range of circumstances that lie between these 
poles. Rudolf (2004: p. 537) agrees that the judgement fails to address a) non-
politicians who have social or economic influence, and well-known people who 
seek publicity in the interests of political or social causes, e.g. a clergyman arguing 
for criminalising abortion who in the past had persuaded a girlfriend to have an 
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abortion, and b) persons who choose to make their private lives public by virtue 
of political or personal objectives, e.g. a politician using his family in an election 
campaign or a celebrity using their fame to support good causes.
The Court does go on, in von Hannover (para. 64), to make some comment 
on the private information of public figures; ‘the public has a right to be in-
formed, which is an essential right in a democratic society that, in certain special 
circumstances can even extend to aspects of the private life of public figures, 
particularly where politicians are concerned’. This links the right to be informed 
to the demands of a democratic society, indicates that politicians are a particular 
kind of public figure and confirms that public figure status does not automati-
cally open up all aspects of private life. It says nothing, though, as to what are 
the ‘special circumstances’ justifying publication.
The key case illustrating the operation of these ‘special circumstances’ for a 
politician’s expectation of privacy is Editions Plon v France (2006) 42 EHRR 36 
(see also Karhuvaara, as discussed above). The case concerned the publication 
of information concerning Francois Mitterrand’s state of health during the time 
he had been French president. The French government opposed publication but 
did recognise the importance of public debate on the right of the electorate to 
receive information about the physical and intellectual capacities of its leaders. 
The applicants argued that the book raised issues of general concern, in that a) 
that the President had assumed a duty of medical transparency and had commit-
ted a ‘State lie’, and b) it addressed a more general debate about the health of 
serving leaders (Editions Plon: para. 40). The Court held that the book was in 
the context of a wide-ranging debate on the public right to be informed about 
serious illness in the Head of State (Editions Plon: para. 44). Whilst there was 
clearly a fairly even balance between the public interest in freedom of expres-
sion and the privacy claim, as time passed the privacy interest which justified an 
interim injunction to protect the legitimate emotions of grief of the relatives had 
waned (Editions Plon: para. 53).
The facts of the case related to the Head of State, but using the ‘rough pro-
portionality’ approach outlined above this could clearly apply with lesser force 
to, for example, the Interior Minister. It could, in theory and dependent on the 
circumstances, stretch to affecting the expectation of medical privacy for other 
powerful figures such as the governor of the national bank or the CEO of a major 
national corporation (e.g. Aerospatiale). 
We can see Editions Plon as an example of legitimate public interest in pri-
vate information flowing from inherent status as a political ‘paradigmatic’ public 
figure. This is where there is scope for differential treatment of politicians. The 
general ways in which public profile can have an impact on the expectation of 
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privacy (outlined above in Section 2.B) are quite limited, but for politicians they 
have a broadened relevance.
Arguments from hypocrisy have a particular resonance when the person act-
ing hypocritically is directing or influencing public policy. Phillipson and Fenwick 
(2000, p.676) use the example of a privately gay politician making conservative 
‘family-values’ policy statements. Rudolf’s similar illustration of the clergyman 
campaigning against abortion (see above) shows that the argument from hypocrisy 
does have a special power when it relates to public role and influence, but also that 
this resonance is not limited to politicians, but extends to all those who have that 
role and influence.
Correcting outright lies will continue to provide a strong public interest in 
expression claims generally and for all public figures regardless of their political 
role. More difficult questions arise in relation to allegations of hypocrisy based 
not on express statements but on non-verbal image projection and management. 
Here we can argue that a married man having an affair and appearing with his 
family in public should not, other things being equal, justify publication where the 
individual is a public figure from the world of sports or entertainment. Where the 
person exercises some influence over public policy in any way that affects married 
and family life, though, their expectation of privacy, including hypocritical non-
verbal representations of their life, ought to reduce in proportion to their influence. 
This can be linked to Rudolf’s (2006: p.537) approach to the issue of voluntary 
revelations. She argues that the legitimate public interest cannot be derived solely 
from public curiosity about a person. It can though flow directly from that person’s 
voluntary participation in public debate.
Even the derided notion of ‘involuntary role model’ seems to have some cur-
rency in relation to politicians. The Court of Appeal in McKennitt found that if the 
notion of expecting higher standards from certain people applied at all, it could 
only apply to certain professions. They gave the examples of headmasters or cler-
gymen, and suggested that these could be joined by politicians (and ‘according to 
taste’, senior civil servants, surgeons and journalists). 
The discussion above illustrated how inherent status as a politician, rather 
than as a general public figure, can affect the expectation of privacy in relation to 
image rights (Krone Verlag) and the latitude of the press to publish personal infor-
mation (Karhuvaara). In some respects Editions Plon can be explained this way. 
The President had engaged his doctor in presenting a false image to the French 
people, but the justification for publication lay not only in correcting the false 
impression but also in the legitimate public interest in Mitterrand’s health flowing 
directly from his inherent status as the most powerful politician in the country.
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So whilst it is a matter of degree rather than wholly separate treatment, the 
cases do disclose that identification as a politician has a legal impact on the pri-
vacy expectation to a different extent than for other public figures. The other con-
clusion that emerges from the analysis above is that it is the power and influence of 
politicians that often provides the justification for finding that their status impacts 
on their reasonable expectation of privacy. Power and influence are obviously not 
unique to politicians and we turn now to whether there are rationales for differen-
tial treatment founded more specifically on their political role.
4. Justification for a Differential Approach
The power and influence that politicians exercise is unique in range and na-
ture. State power includes, inter alia, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, 
powers of taxation, law-making and the compulsory adjudication of disputes. This 
seems in itself to provide a rationale for differentiation, but since this line of argu-
ment identifies power and influence over citizens as a key factor, it really it goes 
towards the question of measuring the relative strength of the privacy and expres-
sion claims. That is, power and influence derived from other, non-State, sources 
can also affect the expectation of privacy. Whether this will be to a greater or 
lesser extent than a ‘politician’ will depend on the level of power and influence 
wielded and the relationship of the private information to that sphere of influence. 
There do though seem to be some rationales that apply particularly to those in, 
largely elected, public office
A. Readers qua Voters
Politicians are not presented to the electorate as merely efficient assessors of 
policy options but, increasingly, as men and women of integrity and vision, whose 
personal characteristics are a good basis for exercising one’s franchise in their 
favour. The Council of Europe Resolution (1998, para 9) states that, ‘Certain facts 
relating to the private lives of public figures, particularly politicians, may indeed 
be of interest to citizens, and it may therefore be legitimate for readers, who are 
also voters, to be informed of these facts’ (see also A v B plc, para 11(xii)). This 
links the lower expectation of privacy for politicians to their representative func-
tion (and therefore excludes figure wielding power in non-elective office).
It was claimed by the newspaper in Karhuvaara that knowledge of the MP’s 
family life could affect the decisions of voters in relation to her. The domestic 
court acknowledged this but found that it ‘did not alone render the matter to be 
of such public interest’ as to justify publication (Karhuvaara: para. 13). The Court 
disagreed with this finding and stated that the fact that the information may affect 
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voting decisions meant that ‘at least to some degree, a matter of public interest 
was involved’ (Karhuvaara: para. 45). There is, quite rightly, limited weight at-
tached to this ‘readers qua voters’ concept and the Court is careful not to suggest 
that it provides carte blanche to scrutinise all aspects of a politician’s life. It does 
though indicate a reluctance to tell citizens the criteria they are entitled to take into 
account in exercising their franchise.
This shows a careful appreciation of the role of law in influencing voting 
decisions in a democratic constitution, but there are some dangers. Phillipson and 
Fenwick agree that the public should be able to decide for themselves what to 
take into account when judging the criteria on which to cast their vote, which can 
open up large area of a politician’s private life to scrutiny. But it is inherent in the 
nature Articles 8 and 10 that politicians must have some right to privacy, and it is 
better to have a test of whether, in the view of a rational person, the information 
could be of real relevance to an assessment of fitness for office. In applying this 
test there is a need to be broadminded and tolerant of social differences (Phillipson 
and Fenwick, 2000, p.688-9).
In relation to the hypothetical example of a story on the homosexual affair of 
a politician who advocates conservative family values (see above), justification 
for publication lies in the fact that it a) contributes to political discussion, b) influ-
ences the standing of the political party in question, and c) reveals a public decep-
tion (Phillipson and Fenwick, 2000, p687-8). We should note that only the second 
of those applies solely to politicians, whilst the others apply to other powerful or 
influential public figures. Finnish law on privacy, outlined above, links the public 
interest in private information to ‘fitness for office’ assessments of not just politi-
cians, but also business people and those holding other types of public office.
B. Mechanisms of Accountability
Politicians are subject to all sorts of mechanisms of accountability that makes 
it much more likely that they will be asked searching questions, or at least be 
asked such questions in circumstances that require an honest answer. In the UK, 
for example, government ministers are required to answer questions before Se-
lect Committees and before Parliament in Ministers Questions. The constitutional 
convention of Individual Ministerial Responsibility has been used to make ‘fitness 
for office’ judgements on ministers based on their private lives (for example, John 
Profumo 1963, David Mellor, 1992, Ron Davies 1998 (see House of Commons, 
2004)). During election time hustings, politicians are asked questions on a wide 
range of issues (often going beyond any portfolio they hold within their political 
party) and are expected to answer them.
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This notion of a legitimate public interest based on principles of transparency 
and democratic control was endorsed by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
in von Hannover (para. 24). In the related area of regulation of criticism the Court 
has said that ‘The limits of acceptable criticism are wider with regard to a politi-
cian acting in his public capacity than in relation to a private individual, as the 
former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every 
word and deed by both journalists and the public at large’ (Krone Verlag: para. 35; 
see also Incal v Turkey (2000) 29 EHRR 449).
The Court’s consistent emphasis on the role of the press as a watchdog of a 
democratic society, and its reluctance to interfere in exercises of expression that 
can be properly linked to public debate and concern (see e.g. Observer and Guard-
ian v United Kingdom [1991] ECHR 13585/88), also underlines the extent to 
which politicians must accept a more intense scrutiny of a wide range of aspects 
of their private life.
C. Reciprocity of Obligations
In Karhuvaara, the newspaper claimed it was disturbing that an MP should 
be trying to limit the freedom of expression of that media source. The rationale 
for being careful about politicians’ attempts to limit expression lies not only in 
the State’s power to effect restrictions on expression (as exemplified by s.15 Par-
liament Act of Finland in that case) but also in the special protection of expres-
sion rights that politicians enjoy. The Court in Karhuvaara (para. 50) mentions the 
longstanding practice for states generally to confer varying degrees of immunity 
to parliamentarians that allows free speech for the citizens’ representatives.
As the Court has consistently held, ‘While precious to all, freedom of expres-
sion is particularly important for political parties and their active members. They 
represent their electorate, draw attention to their preoccupations and defend their 
interests. Accordingly, interferences with the freedom of expression of a politician 
… call for the closest scrutiny on the Court’s part’ (Incal v Turkey: para.46). In 
Jerusalem v Austria (2003) 37 EHRR 25, even though the speech was not made 
in Parliament the Court protected the politician’s expression claim because it was 
made in an analogous situation (a Municipal Council debate). Since politicians 
are the beneficiaries of particular protection of their expression rights they should 
be ready to be exposed to exercises of freedom of expression by others. Finding 
otherwise would result an imbalance in favour of the State that would be inappro-
priate in a liberal State.
Ultimately these arguments are secondary and supplemental to the key issue 
of the extent of the power and influence wielded by the complainant. It is the scope 
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of this power and a reasonable relationship between the contested information 
and the individual’s power that provides the strongest rationale for disclosure and 
though, as we have seen, whilst politicians may be paradigmatic of this attribute 
of ‘public figure’ this is not confined to politicians.
5. Conclusion
Following the judgment in von Hannover, Sanderson (2004: p.637) argued 
that the Court never properly explains the reasons that justify distinguishing be-
tween politicians and private citizens. She called for consideration of a category 
of intermediate figures; those who had no formal state function but a sufficiently 
high public profile to be of interest to the general public.
The conclusion here is that formal categorization is not the answer. A reason-
able expectation of privacy test that takes into account public function/power/pro-
file as relevant criteria will perform better. This is because in the context of a bal-
ance between rights (Articles 8 and 10 ECHR) any test needs finer gradations than 
can be provided by monolithic categories. The danger of a case-by-case approach 
though is uncertainty and inconsistency, so there is a need for some principled 
account of the relationship between being a public figure and the expectation of 
privacy. A full account of this for all public figures is beyond the scope of this pa-
per but for those exercising State power the arguments point most clearly to find-
ing some reasonable relationship between the private information and the public 
role or activities of the individual concerned. As the core of this relationship is 
the power and influence which the individual wields then, whilst we can identify 
some special characteristics of State power, it is far from clear why this approach 
should not be applied to others who wield significant power and influence derived 
from non-State sources.
References
Aplin, T. (2007), The development of the action for breach of confi-
dence in a post-HRA era, Intellectual Property Quarterly 1(1): pp.19-57




Chadwick, P. (2006) The value of privacy, European Human Rights Law Review 
8: pp.495-508
55Politicians as a Species of “Public Figure” and The Right to Privacy
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1165/1998, The right to 
privacy, consulted September 2007
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA98/eres1165.htm
Fenwick, H. and G. Phillipson, (2006) Media Freedom under the Human Rights 
Act. Oxford: Oxford University Press
House of Commons, Research Paper 04/31, (2004) Individual ministerial re-
sponsibility – issues and examples, consulted September 2007
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rp04-031.pdf
McInnes, R. (2004) Celebrities Anonymous: Whatever Next?, Human Rights and 
UK Practice 5(4): pp.3-12
Ovey, C. and R. White (2006) Jacobs and White: European Convention on Hu-
man Rights. 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Phillipson, G. and H. Fenwick (2000) Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Rem-
edy in the Human Rights Act Era, Modern Law Review 63(5): pp.660-93
Phillipson, G. (2003) Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common 
Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act, Modern Law Review 66(5): 
pp.726-58
Rudolf, B. (2006) Council of Europe: von Hannover v Germany, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 4(3): pp.533-39
Sanderson, M. (2004) Is von Hannover v Germany a Step Backward for the Sub-
stantive Analysis of Speech and Privacy Interests, European Human Rights Law 
Review 6: pp.631-644

